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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The 1990s and 2000s were a period of ‘hyper-globalisation’ (Subramanian & Kessler, 2013), marked 
by particularly rapid rises in international trade and capital flows.1 According to many observers, this 
had a number of benefits, not least much faster rates of convergence across the developing world, 
particularly from the late 1990s onwards (ibid; see also Abiad et al., 2014; Bourguignon,  2015). 
Nonetheless, the failure to manage some of the downsides of globalisation has, it is argued, contrib-
uted to a growing political backlash against globalisation since the early 2000s (e.g., Rodrik, 2018; 
Stiglitz, 2018). This has in turn threatened to undermine the benefits of globalisation, through a return 
to trade protectionism and economic nationalism.
Changes in the level and composition of government spending are one key way in which governments 
can manage the process of globalisation. According to the ‘compensation hypothesis’ (Garrett, 1998; 
Rodrik, 1998), governments respond to globalisation by increasing spending, either as a way of compen-
sating the adversely affected (e.g., workers in import-competing sectors) or, more generally, as a means 
of offsetting the volatility and insecurity resulting from greater exposure to global markets. Rodrik (1998) 
found strong empirical support for this hypothesis, in the form of a robust positive relationship between 
 1The 1990s and 2000s have also been referred to as the period of ‘high globalisation’ (Milanovic 2016) and ‘New 
Globalisation’ (Baldwin 2016:79): roughly speaking, the period beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ending with 
the start of the global financial crisis. Further details on trends in trade and capital flows in this period are provided in Section 
5 below.
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openness to trade and government spending in the 1980s and early 1990s, which applied to almost all 
categories of spending, and was evident among both developed and developing countries.
However, the positive relationship between globalisation and spending may have weakened—or 
indeed been reversed—during the period of hyper-globalisation, for two reasons. First, the 1990s and 
2000s have been characterised by particularly rapid increases in international capital mobility (Chinn 
& Ito, 2006, 2008; Lane & Milesi-Ferreti, 2007; World Bank, 2002). According to the ‘efficiency 
hypothesis’ (Garrett, 2001; Gemmell et al., 2008; Sinn, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002), this process of acceler-
ated financial globalisation may have put pressure on governments to reduce spending, due to a reduc-
tion in tax revenues resulting from global competition to attract and retain mobile financial capital. 
The second reason relates to the changing nature of world trade since the early 1990s, associated with 
the fragmentation of production across borders—referred to as the ‘second unbundling’ by Baldwin 
(2016). This has meant that successful participation in world trade increasingly requires participation 
in global production networks, often through inward foreign direct investment (FDI), and competition 
among countries to attract FDI may again put downward pressure on government spending, at least in 
sectors not considered to be economically productive.2
Some prima facie evidence in support of a negative relationship between globalisation and govern-
ment spending can be found in the fact that the rapid rise in international trade and capital mobility 
during the 1990s and 2000s has coincided with an aggregate decline in government spending as a share 
of GDP, as documented further below. However, simple comparisons of aggregate trends should be 
treated with caution. In this paper, therefore, we provide a detailed empirical assessment of the rela-
tionship between globalisation and government spending for the 1990s and 2000s. Two main questions 
motivate our analysis, namely (a) whether there is any evidence of a weakening or reversal of the positive 
relationship between globalisation and government spending during the 1990s and 2000s, in compari-
son with earlier decades, which could help explain the emerging political backlash against globalisation 
since the early 2000s; and (b) whether any evidence of a negative relationship is stronger for measures of 
financial globalisation, reflecting the growing international mobility of capital and finance, as opposed 
to measures of trade globalisation, reflecting the international mobility of goods and services. We also 
revisit the question as to whether the size or direction of the relationship between trade openness and 
government spending varies across countries, e.g., between countries more or less exposed to external 
volatility, as implied by the compensation hypothesis and emphasised by Rodrik (1998).
Our paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, we are to our knowledge the first 
to examine the relationship between globalisation and government spending specifically for the ‘hy-
per-globalisation’ period of the 1990s and 2000s, and to compare the evidence for this period with 
earlier decades. Second, we control more effectively for the potential endogeneity of existing mea-
sures of globalisation than has been possible in previous research, by making use of a new set of in-
strumental variables developed in related empirical work (Dorn et al., 2018; Felbermayr & 
Gröschl, 2013; Lang & Tavares, 2018). Finally, we assemble a new data set on disaggregated govern-
ment spending for the period 1990–2016, derived from the IMF Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS) database, allowing us to extend the analysis beyond the level of overall government consump-
tion expenditure, to more disaggregated components of spending such as health, education and social 
welfare. This makes our study the first of which we are aware to study the relationship between glo-
balisation and detailed subcategories of spending for the period of the 1990s and 2000s.3
 2See Subramanian and Kessler (2013) on the surge in FDI flows and stocks during the period of hyper-globalisation.
 3Our data set is freely available for other researchers to use and is available on request from the authors. We have data for 
slightly more countries for the economic as opposed to functional classification of expenditure (164 compared to 139; we 
have data for both classifications for 138 countries).
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In terms of econometric methods, we use a two-way fixed-effects method with Driscoll–Kraay 
standard errors (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998) to address cross-sectional dependence, combined with in-
strumental variable (IV) estimation to account for contemporaneous endogeneity between globalisa-
tion and government spending. For spending data, we use government final consumption expenditure 
from the Penn World Tables (version 9.0), alongside the disaggregated spending data derived from 
the IMF GFS database. For measures of globalisation, we use the most recent version of the KOF 
globalisation index (Gygli et al., 2018), focusing specifically on the subindices for trade and finan-
cial globalisation, each of which is disaggregated into de facto and de jure components—the former 
reflecting actual flows of goods and services or capital across countries, and the latter reflecting the 
extent of government restrictions on such flows. We also make use of two more commonly used glo-
balisation indicators, in particular the trade–GDP ratio (also sourced from the Penn World Tables) and 
the Chinn–Ito capital account liberalisation index (Chinn & Ito, 2006).
In terms of the results, we find that the ‘hyper-globalisation’ of the 1990s and 2000s had divergent 
and conflicting effects on government spending. While de jure trade globalisation tended to raise 
consumption spending, consistent with the compensation hypothesis, de jure financial globalisation 
tended to reduce it, consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. We also find evidence of a positive 
effect of de facto trade globalisation, but which weakened significantly during the 1990s and 2000s 
compared with the 1970s and 1980s. Our results also confirm the importance of controlling for endog-
eneity in this context, particularly for the KOF indices of trade globalisation, with large differences in 
the results between IV estimation and more standard fixed-effects estimation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most recent 
evidence on the relationship between globalisation and government spending, updating an earlier 
review by Gemmell et al. (2008). Sections 3 and 4 then outline the methodology and data used in our 
econometric analysis, while Section 5 provides some initial exploratory analysis of the data. Section 6 
then presents our main results, Section 7 our additional results and robustness tests, and Section 8 our 
conclusions.
2 |  LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the seminal contribution by Rodrik (1998), there is now a substantial empirical literature on the 
globalisation-spending relationship. Gemmell et al.  (2008) reviewed 19 studies published between 
1995 and 2006, and found that the number finding a positive relationship between openness to trade 
or capital flows and government spending was broadly balanced by a similar number of studies find-
ing a negative relationship (ibid: 156).4 In this section, we update the results of Gemmell et al. (2008), 
by briefly reviewing the results of 13 empirical studies published since 2006.5
Basic details about each study are contained in Table 1. In terms of the results, we find a relatively 
mixed picture, similar to the findings of Gemmell et al. (2008). Turning first to consumption spending, 
three studies find a consistently positive and statistically significant relationship with trade openness: 
Epifani and Gancia (2009), Ram (2009) and Shonchoy (2016). However, Benarroch and Pandey (2008, 
2012) find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship, while Jetter and Parmeter (2015) find 
that the results vary depending on the data used: strong evidence of a positive relationship when using 
 4All of the studies reviewed by Gemmell et al (2008) use data up to the late 1990s at the latest.
 5The review is not designed to be exhaustive; the aim is instead to give a reflection of some of the most recent evidence. For 
other recent studies looking at the effects of globalisation on government spending, and other dimensions of fiscal policy, see 
Potrakfe (2015).
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PWT 6.1 data, but much less evidence when using PWT 7.1, and no evidence when using PWT 8.0 
(if anything, a negative relationship). In terms of the other globalisation measures, Kimakova (2009) 
finds a positive relationship between consumption spending and private capital flows, while Ashraf 
et al. (2017) find a similar relationship with inward ‘greenfield’ FDI. However, Meinhard and Potrafke 
(2012) find no evidence of a significant relationship between consumption spending and the KOF 
index of economic globalisation (which includes openness to trade and capital flows), although they 
do find a positive and statistically significant relationship for both social and political globalisation.
The results for other spending measures are also mixed. For total spending, Shelton (2007) finds 
evidence of a positive relationship with trade openness, but Gemmell et al. (2008) and Benarroch and 
Pandey (2012) find no evidence of a relationship, while Liberati (2007) finds a negative relationship 
with openness to trade and capital flows. Kim et al. (2018) find evidence of a positive relationship 
with the KOF ‘trade globalisation’ subindex, but a negative relationship with the financial, social and 
political subindices. When disaggregating spending, Epifani and Gancia (2009) find no consistent 
evidence of a relationship between trade openness and social security and welfare spending. Benarroch 
and Pandey (2012) find evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and education, 
defence and housing spending among LICs, while Shelton (2007) finds some evidence of a positive 
relationship between trade openness and education, defence and transport spending. For all other cat-
egories of spending, however, these studies find no evidence of a significant relationship with trade 
openness.6 Gemmell et al. (2008) also find very little evidence of a relationship between trade open-
ness and disaggregated government spending. However, they do find evidence that the stock of inward 
FDI significantly increases social welfare, health and general public spending, while it significantly 
reduces spending on transport, housing, education and economic services.
Finally, there are again mixed results as to whether the positive relationship between trade open-
ness and government spending is stronger among countries, which are more exposed to external risk, 
as implied by the compensation hypothesis. Rodrik (1998) found positive and statistically significant 
interaction terms between trade openness and two measures of external risk: the terms of trade vola-
tility and the product concentration of exports. Benarroch and Pandey (2008) also found a positive and 
significant interaction term between trade openness and terms of trade volatility. However, Epifani 
and Gancia (2009) find that interaction terms between trade openness and measures of external risk 
are typically insignificant or negative, contrary to the compensation hypothesis.7
To summarise, there remains a wide range of empirical results in the literature, with as yet no ap-
parent consensus. Similar to Gemmell et al. (2008), we find that the number of studies finding a pos-
itive relationship between measures of globalisation and government spending is roughly balanced by 
the number of studies not finding a relationship. Two further points are worth noting. First, there is 
very little evidence specifically examining the hyper-globalisation period of the 1990s and 2000s. The 
one exception is Meinhard and Potrafke (2012), who test whether the relationship between KOF glo-
balisation indices and consumption spending differs between the periods 1970–89 and 1990–2004. 
However, these authors do not distinguish between the trade and financial components of the KOF 
economic globalisation index, which were found by Kim et al. (2018) to have quite different effects on 
spending. By contrast, in this paper we not only focus specifically on the 1990s and 2000s, and com-
pare this period with earlier decades, but also disaggregate between the trade and financial compo-
nents of economic globalisation. Second, none of the studies in Table 1 make use of instrumental 
 6Shelton (2007) also disaggregates spending according to the IMF economic classification and finds some evidence that trade 
openness increases spending on social transfers, most strongly for OECD countries.
 7Epifani and Gancia (2009) instead find that the relationship is stronger among countries, which export relatively more 
differentiated goods, which, they argue, reduces the domestic cost of taxation.
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variable (IV) estimation to control for the potential endogeneity of globalisation, instead tending to 
rely on panel data methods (e.g., fixed effects). As is well known, however, such methods can only 
control for time-invariant unobserved factors, which may confound the relationship between globali-
sation and spending.8 In this paper, we make use of a new set of instrumental variables developed in 
related empirical work to control for both time-variant and time-invariant confounding factors.
3 |  METHODS
We examine the relationship between globalisation and government spending using the following 
basic equation as a starting point:
where  is a vector of government spending variables, i and t represent country and year, 
respectively. We estimate this model using annual data, although we also repeat the estimations using 
5-year averages as a robustness test.  refers to a vector of globalisation variables, which we lag by 
one year as one part of our strategy for addressing endogeneity concerns (see below); X represents con-
trol variables. Year dummy, country dummy and the error term are given as  ,  and , respectively. 
A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the globalisation indices implies evidence of the 
compensation hypothesis, while a negative and statistically significant coefficient suggests evidence of 
the efficiency hypothesis. For the main results, all variables are measured in the natural logarithm form, 
with the exception of the KOF globalisation indices (see below). We estimate Equation (1) using data 
first for 1990–2014, then for 1970–2014; in the latter case, we include interaction terms between each 
globalisation and a dummy for the period 1990–2014, to test for differences in the relationship between 
globalisation and spending in the hyper-globalisation period.
We make use of the two-way fixed-effects estimator. The two-way fixed-effects model helps ac-
count for possible biases due to omitted country-specific and time-invariant factors. There are how-
ever two main challenges with the typical two-way fixed-effects estimator in our case, namely (a) 
cross-sectional dependence and (b) contemporaneousendogeneity. Cross-sectional dependence is pos-
sible in any panel data as panel groups (countries in our case) are independent, heterogeneous and 
susceptible to shocks from each other. We account for cross-sectional dependence by using a two-way 
fixed-effects estimator with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors (DK-SE; see Driscoll & Kraay, 1998).9 
DK-SEs are heteroscedasticity-consistent and robust to general forms of temporal and cross-sectional 
dependence, and are especially relevant in our case with smaller time dimension.
Further, we acknowledge that there are likely to be causality issues due to contemporaneous endog-
eneity. More generally, the level of exposure to trade risks is likely to differ between countries due to 
say geography and differences in government policies (e.g., tariff and non-tariff barriers). In the case 
of the former, trade partners that are large in nature but located further away from each other are likely 
to be self-sufficient with lower bilateral trade ratios. For the latter, where countries have high tariff 
 8This mirrors the broader empirical literature on the consequences of globalisation: a neglect of issues of causality and 
potential reverse causality (Potrakfe 2015). It is worth noting that Rodrik (1998) used IV estimation to extract the exogenous 
component of trade openness, but in the context of a cross-sectional regression using instruments that varied across countries 
but were constant over time.
(1)=+it−1+X+ t+i+

 9Using the typical two-way fixed-effects estimator, we find evidence of cross-sectional dependence using the Pesaran LM 
tests (Pesaran, 2004).
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and non-tariff barriers to trade, they are likely to have lower exposure to trade. Given that the trade 
openness measure is a combination of trade and GDP, issues of endogeneity arise which make it dif-
ficult to trace the direction of causality (see Rodrik, 1998). We give two examples of endogeneity 
specific to our paper. First, our sample period covers the global financial crisis, which was associated 
with a decline in openness to trade in many countries, but also an increase in government spending 
(due to large fiscal stimulus programmes). Controlling for contemporaneous GDP may not be a suffi-
cient control in this case, since this would not reflect the delayed effects of the crisis on both spending 
and openness; time fixed effects may also be insufficient, since the crisis affected countries differently 
and at different points in time. Second, trade liberalisation policies may create endogeneity issues. A 
cut in tariffs will affect openness but may also have effects on government budgets inducing govern-
ments to cut back on government consumption.10
To control for potential endogeneity, we construct instrumental variables for each of our globali-
sation measures following the approaches of Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013), also adopted by Dorn 
et al. (2018), and Lang and Tavares (); further details are provided in Section 4.3 below. Finally, we 
include a system-generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator among our robustness checks 
in Section 7. GMM estimation accounts for persistence in its dynamic expression by including the 
lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory term (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 
1998; Roodman, 2009a, 2009b). Government spending is likely to be persistent: (a) current levels of 
spending are likely to be dependent on previous levels of spending, and (b) a government spending 
item (e.g., spending on infrastructure) may be spread over more than one period. Further, GMM partly 
serves as a robustness check for our IV estimation since we include the lags of the variables as instru-
ments to control for endogeneity.
4 |  DATA
In this section, we describe the variables used in the analysis and sources of data. A full list of all 
variables and definitions, together with the descriptive statistics for each variable, and the correlation 
matrix, is provided in the Appendix (Tables A1–A3).
4.1 | Government spending
The compensation hypothesis suggests that the relationship between globalisation and government 
spending should be the strongest for spending in two areas: consumption spending and (particu-
larly in OECD countries) social welfare spending.11 We concentrate on consumption spending in 
our main results (Section 5); we then consider social welfare spending, alongside other disaggre-
gated measures of spending in our additional results (Section 6). We proxy consumption spending 
by the Penn World Table (PWT) government final consumption expenditure measure given its 
 10We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing these out.
 11That is, 'If government spending played a risk-mitigating role, we would expect to see this primarily reflected in income 
transfer programs and in social security and welfare spending. In most developing countries, income transfer schemes tend to 
be rudimentary for reasons of administrative capacity. Consequently, their governments tend to rely on public employment, 
in-kind transfers, and public-works programs— all of which show up in government consumption—in order to broaden safety 
nets. But in advanced countries with social welfare programs in place, it should be primarily spending on social security and 
welfare that is correlated with exposure to external risk, not government consumption'. (Rodrik 1998:1019).
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advantage over other measures (see Rodrik, 1998; pp. 1001). With regard to the social welfare 
spending data, we use and report the results for the IMF ECOG classification (‘social 
benefits’).12
Moreover, given that globalisation may generate pressures for governments to spend more in 
certain areas, (e.g., 'productive investment': infrastructure to attract mobile capital; see Gemmell 
et al., 2008), we consider other categories of spending. We follow Oxley and Martin (1991) and 
categorise spending into pure public goods (general public services plus defence plus public order 
and safety spending), merit goods (housing and community amenities plus health plus education 
spending) and economic services (economic affairs plus environment protection plus recreation, 
culture and religion spending). The effect of globalisation on disaggregated spending is however 
likely to be dependent on the specific spending type (see Gemmell et al., 2008).
4.2 | Globalisation
We use a range of measures to capture the different aspects of a country's openness that may affect 
government spending. The first is the KOF globalisation index.13 This is a composite index, which 
spans three different dimensions of globalisation (economic, social and political). We focus on the 
subindices for ‘trade globalisation’ and ‘financial globalisation’ (subcategories of the economic di-
mension), which are designed to measure countries’ openness to international trade and capital flows, 
respectively. According to the compensation hypothesis, greater exposure to international trade im-
plies higher external exposure to external risk and volatility, which in turn generates demands for 
higher spending. By contrast, greater exposure to international capital flows implies greater pressure 
on governments to reduce spending, due to lower tax revenues (as suggested by the efficiency hypoth-
esis). Since theory suggests that they may have different effects on spending, we include them sepa-
rately in our regressions. They are also not that highly correlated: the correlation coefficient is 
approximately 0.68 in the full sample.
There are fewer grounds in theory for expecting that the other dimensions of globalisation in-
cluded in the KOF index will affect spending; nonetheless, we still include these as control variables 
(see Section 4.4 below). We also test separately for the effects of the ‘de facto’ trade and financial 
globalisation indices, which reflect actual flows of goods and services or capital that cross national 
borders, and ‘de jure’ indices, which reflect the extent of government policies that, in principle, either 
restrict or enable these flows. These are again not that highly correlated: the correlation coefficient is 
just 0.29 between the de facto and de jure trade globalisation indices, and 0.44 between the de facto 
and de jure financial globalisation indices (Table A3). We also use two separate indicators of eco-
nomic globalisation widely used in the literature, namely the ratio of trade to GDP (‘trade openness’) 
from the PWT, which is fairly closely correlated with the de facto trade globalisation index, and the 
Chinn–Ito index of capital account liberalisation (Chinn & Ito, 2006), which is highly correlated with 
the de jure financial globalisation index.
 12This measure of social welfare spending is highly correlated with the alternative IMF COFOG classification (‘social 
protection’); the correlation coefficient is 0.957 in the full sample. Hence, their regression estimates tend to show 
qualitatively similar results; we report in the text any substantive differences.
 13The original KOF index was produced by Dreher (2006). The latest version is Gygli et al (2018); this includes data for over 
200 countries between 1970 and 2015.
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4.3 | Instruments
We construct instrumental variables for each of our globalisation measures. For the four KOF indices 
(trade and financial globalisation, de facto and de jure globalisation), we follow the approach of Lang 
and Tavares (2018). For each country and year in our sample, we calculate the one-period lagged, 
inverse-distance-weighted average KOF index for all other countries, i.e., 
where dij is the population-weighted distance between all population centres in countries i and j (from 
Mayer and Zignago 2011), and i, j ∈ I is the set of countries in our sample. This instrument draws on re-
cent evidence suggesting that the adoption of significant government policy reforms is often spatially 
correlated, with reforms in one country triggering similar reforms in neighbouring or close-by countries, 
due to competition, coercion or simple imitation (see, e.g., Fenton Villar, 2020; Simmons et al., 2006; 
Simmons & Elkins, 2004).14
For the trade–GDP ratio, we follow the approach of Felbermayr and Gröschl (2013), which was 
also adopted by Dorn et al. (2018). This involves predicting bilateral openness using a gravity model 
within a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimation framework, with standard errors 
clustered using country pairs. The procedure involves regressing bilateral trade on exogenous bilateral 
variables (population) and bilateral geographic variables (contiguity and distance). Other exogenous 
variables include large-scale natural disasters, and an interaction term between the incidence of natu-
ral disasters and international financial remoteness, or land area, or population. The regression in-
cludes country and time fixed effects. The sum of the predicted openness values of each country over 
all the bilateral country pairs is then used as an instrument for trade openness.15 For the Chinn–Ito 
index, we use the instrument for the KOF de jure financial globalisation index, on the grounds that the 
Chinn–Ito index is one important component of this KOF index.
We test for the relevance of our instruments by examining the F-statistics for excluded instruments 
from each of our first-stage regressions, combined with Kleibergen–Paap and Cragg–Donald tests for 
under-identification and weak identification.16 We also test for the endogeneity of our globalisation 
measures to determine whether IV estimation is required. The results of these tests are contained in 
Table A4. On the whole, the results of these tests indicate that an IV approach is warranted and that 
our instruments are relevant. One exception is the KOF indices of de jure financial globalisation and 
the Chinn–Ito index, where our instruments did not pass the relevance tests. We decided therefore to 
treat these measures of financial globalisation as exogenous in our regressions, even though without 
valid instruments, we are unable to rule out endogeneity concerns. The other exception is the 
trade–GDP ratio, where our instrument passes the relevance test, but there is no evidence of endoge-












 14Note that for the IV regressions, we lag each globalisation measure by one year in our main estimating regression (equation 
1 above), so our first-stage regressions involve regressing the one-period lagged value of each globalisation index on the 
two-period lagged value of the instrument.
 15Dorn et al. (2018) provide detailed explanation of the instrument used and its construction. The definition of large natural 
disasters is also provided. Other studies that have used similar instruments for trade openness are Frankel and Romer (1999) 
and Eppinger and Potrafke (2015).
 16Note that we are unable to test for instrument exogeneity, as our IV regressions are all exactly identified.
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4.4 | Control variables
4.4.1 | Baseline controls
We refer to the control variables in our main results as our baseline controls. These are real GDP per 
capita, dependency ratio, urbanisation, total population and price ratio.
The Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0) provides data on expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs, 
population and price ratio. We therefore obtain real GDP per capita by dividing the PWT real GDP 
measure by total population from PWT (for consistency), as in Gemmell et al. (2008) and Benarroch 
and Pandey (2012). Following Musgrave's (1969) interpretation of Wagner's Law (Wagner, 1983), 
increases in the levels of GDP per capita are expected to lead to increases in government expenditure 
as a share of GDP; hence, we expect a positive relationship between real GDP per capita and govern-
ment consumption spending as a share of GDP. Price ratio from PWT is the ratio of the price level of 
government consumption to the price level of household consumption. It is a measure of the relative 
public sector and private sector prices, and an appropriate control for changes in relative prices over 
time (Gemmell et al. 2008). However, its effect on spending may be positive or negative.
Data on dependency and urbanisation are obtained from the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators data set (World Bank, 2018). We follow similar studies and use these variables as controls 
(Benarroch & Pandey, 2008, 2012; Rodrik, 1998; Shelton, 2007). We measure dependency as the sum 
of the population in the ages 0–14 years and the population in the ages 65+ as a percentage of the 
total population. An increase in dependency ratio will likely be associated with an increase in demand 
for higher government consumption spending (since dependents are usually economically inactive 
and are likely to be reliant on government consumption spending). Hence, we expect a positive rela-
tionship between consumption spending and dependency ratio. We measure urbanisation as the urban 
population as a percentage of total population. We expect government spending on consumption to in-
crease with an increase in urbanisation. The argument here is simple: an increase in urbanisation may 
create congestion, which is likely to lead to a reduction in the welfare of the citizenry. Such welfare 
loss may need to be compensated for by increased government spending. Notwithstanding, additional 
spending on non-rival public goods such as roads and street lighting may decrease with increasing 
urbanisation due to economies of scale.
With regard to total population, Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) indicate that countries with large 
population are associated with small government consumption spending as a share of GDP for varying 
reasons. First, the per capita cost of providing non-rival goods is lower for larger populations (larger 
economies of scale; see Rodrik, 1998; and Jetter & Parmeter, 2015). In addition, preferences over the 
provision of public goods are more heterogeneous in larger populations. The net effect therefore de-
pends on the trade-off between the costs associated with greater heterogeneity in preferences and the 
benefits due to lower per capita cost in public goods provision, although the latter may outweigh the 
former (see Shelton, 2007). Hence, total population may have a positive or negative effect on spending 
(Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998; and Rodrik, 1998).
4.4.2 | Additional controls
Our robustness test includes introducing additional controls in Equation (1) to check whether the esti-
mates of the globalisation variables remain consistent in the sign and direction of their effects. These 
additional controls are in two forms: (a) two measures of potential sources of additional revenue for gov-
ernments (i.e., external debt stock and foreign aid), and (b) a measure of institutional quality (Polity2).
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We obtain data on external debt stock and foreign aid receipts from WDI (2018). External debt 
stock is external debt stock as a percentage of gross national income, and foreign aid is the net official 
development assistance (ODA) receipts as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).The idea is 
that, in the face of limited resources, governments may find external debt (true for both developed and 
developing countries) and foreign aid (especially true for developing countries) appropriate sources 
of external inflows to augment domestic revenue shortfalls to finance government activities. Hence, 
government consumption spending may increase with increases in both external debt stock and for-
eign aid inflows. However, in the case of foreign aid, while flypaper effects argue that increases in 
foreign aid receipts lead to more than proportionate increases in consumption spending, aid fungibil-
ity arguments suggest increases in foreign aid receipts will be associated with less that proportionate 
increases in spending, or rather a redistribution of spending. Rodrik (1998) controls for external debt 
stock, while Shonchoy (2016) controls for foreign aid receipts.
We adopt the Polity2 index from the Polity4 project (Marshall et al., 2014) as a measure of political 
regime strength. Although other studies generate democracy and autocracy measures from this index 
(see Shonchoy, 2016), we consider the distinction between democracy and autocracy less relevant in 
our case since most of the countries in our sample were democratic in the period of our study. We 
examine the influence of the existing political regime strength on government spending. The argument 
here is that government spending is likely to vary over a spectrum of political regime strength. Polity2 
provides a political regime strength spectrum that ranges from hereditary monarchy to consolidated 
democracy. Finally, we include the Gini index of market income inequality, taken from the Standardised 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID; Solt, 2019). Income inequality is related both to globali-
sation (e.g., due to the effects of trade openness on the relative returns to skilled and unskilled labour; 
see, e.g., Anderson, 2005; Dorn et al., 2018) and to government spending (e.g., due to political pres-
sures on governments to engage in more redistributive spending; see, e.g., Meltzer & Richard, 1981; 
Roine et al., 2009; Gründler & Köllner, 2017; Dorn & Schinke, 2018).17
4.4.3 | Interaction terms
To examine whether there is any evidence that the size or direction of the relationship between glo-
balisation and spending varies between advanced countries (OECD countries here) and developing 
countries (non-OECD countries here), we introduce an interaction term between the globalisation 
variables and a dummy variable for OECD. We consider OECD countries that existed at the start of 
the period (i.e., OECD countries in 1990). Our interaction term is similar to Shelton (2007).
We test whether the size or direction of the effect of trade globalisation varies between countries 
more exposed to external risks, particularly terms of trade shocks. We measure a country's external 
risk by an interaction between the globalisation variable and the export concentration index. The ex-
port concentration (or diversification) index is from the WITS Trade Data. For the missing years, we 
complement the data by its related measure from the UNCTAD, the concentration index or Hirschman 
(H) index. It is a measure of the extent to which a country's exports are concentrated (based on a 
single or few goods) or diversified (based on a lot more goods). It gives an indication as to whether 
a large share of a country's exports is accounted for by a small number of commodities or vice versa. 
The index ranges between zero for a country with no exports and 1 for a country with a single export 
 17Note, however, that inequality may also be thought of as a ‘mediating’ variable, in the sense that at least part of the effect of 
globalisation on government spending operates through its effect on income inequality. If this is the case, controlling for 
inequality would lower the estimated effect of globalisation on spending.
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commodity. Therefore, the lower the index, the less concentrated (hence more diversified) are a coun-
try's exports. Countries that export only a few commodities are more exposed to external risk—in 
particular to changes in the prices of those commodities on world markets—than countries that export 
a wide range of commodities. Hence, countries with lower export concentration index face lower ex-
ternal risk, while countries with high concentration index face higher levels of external risk.
4.5 | Sample sizes
For our main estimations, we use two samples: first, a balanced panel of 137 countries over the period 
1992–2014 (3,151 observations in total), including 24 OECD countries and 113 non-OECD countries; 
and second, a slightly smaller panel (again balanced) of 116 countries over period 1972–2014 (4,988 
observations), including 24 OECD countries and 92 non-OECD countries. In each case, we lose some 
observations for regressions including the trade–GDP ratio, the Chinn–Ito index and the export con-
centration index, due to missing values of these variables (or their instruments).18 For our results using 
the disaggregated spending measures, we use samples of between 66 and 97 countries, over the period 
1990–2016; the panels in this case are unbalanced, with data for different countries spanning different 
subperiods.
5 |  EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
Prior to the formal econometric analysis, we carry out some exploratory analysis of the data. We first 
discuss aggregate trends in globalisation and government spending over time; we then look at trends 
at the country level, using simple bivariate correlations to establish whether there is any prima facie 
evidence of the compensation or efficiency hypothesis during the 1990s and 2000s.
Figure 1 shows trends in a range of measures of economic globalisation since 1970. We plot the 
(unweighted) mean value of each measure over time, for a constant sample of countries.19 The evi-
dence confirms that the 1990s and 2000s were indeed marked by particularly rapid rises in interna-
tional trade and capital mobility. The KOF trade globalisation indices (both de facto and de jure) rose 
gradually during the 1970s and 1980s and then accelerated in the early to mid-1990s, reaching a peak 
around the time of the global financial crisis in 2008. Similar patterns are observed in the trade open-
ness measure and in the Chinn–Ito index of capital mobility, which both rose rapidly during the 1990s, 
again reaching a peak in the late 2000s. The one exception is the KOF indices of financial globalisa-
tion, which show either a relatively constant increase until the early 2000s before slowing down in the 
mid-2000s (de facto), or no trend at all (de jure). However, if we disaggregate these indices between 
OECD and non-OECD countries, we do see a clear acceleration of financial globalisation in the 1990s 
for non-OECD countries; among OECD countries, the acceleration began slightly earlier, in the 1980s, 
and reached a peak by the mid-1990s.20
 18Note also that we lose two years of data due to the two-year lag built into our IV approach (see footnote 20). To promote 
comparability, we also exclude these years from the samples used for the DK-FE estimations.
 19Note that the samples of countries used to construct Figure 1 are larger than those used for the regression analysis, since 
data for the dependent variable and all other explanatory variables are not always available.
 20For the KOF trade globalisation indices and trade openness, the acceleration in the 1990s also mainly reflects trends in 
non-OECD countries; among OECD countries, the rise is more constant over time, with some evidence of an acceleration 
only in the 2000s.
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Figure 2 shows trends in government spending since 1970. Here, we plot the annual (unweighted) 
mean value of government consumption spending as a share of GDP, taken from two different sources 
(the PWT and the WDI), for a constant sample of countries in each case. Here, the overall pattern is 
almost the reverse of Figure 1: spending rises as a share of GDP during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
before falling substantially during the late 1980s and 1990s, and then stabilising and recovering 
slightly during the 2000s. Note that the WDI measure of spending appears to start rising slightly ear-
lier than the PWT measure, although the magnitude of changes over the period is smaller than for the 
PWT measure. If we disaggregate between OECD and non-OECD countries, the trends are very sim-
ilar in the 1970s and 1980s, but spending stabilised and began rising again from the late 1990s among 
OECD countries, as opposed to the mid- to late 2000s among non-OECD countries.21
Overall therefore, the evidence in Figures 1 and 2 might be considered to support the ‘efficiency 
hypothesis’, in that the rapid rise in international trade and capital mobility during the 1990s and 
2000s coincided with an aggregate decline in government consumption spending as a share of GDP.22 
Of course, various other factors might account for the trends shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, there is 
substantial variation across countries. For example, while the mean rise in the PWT trade openness 
measure between 1990 and 2008 was 27 percentage points, it rose by less than 10 percentage points in 
one quarter of countries, and in fact fell in 10% of countries. The interesting question therefore is 
whether countries experiencing larger increases in trade or financial openness during the period expe-
rienced different trends in government spending.
Some initial evidence on this question is shown in Figure 3. Here we plot, for as many countries 
as possible, the change in each measure of economic globalisation between 1990 and 2008 against 
the change in government consumption spending as a share of GDP over the same period (from the 
PWT). The results show no evidence of a significant correlation between changes in government 
spending and changes in either trade or financial openness, positive or negative. We also tried re-run-
ning the scatter plots shown in Figure 3 using other measures of spending: consumption spending 
from the WDI and social spending from the IMF. We also tried plotting the change in globalisation 
between 1990 and 1999 against the subsequent change in government spending between 2000 and 
2008, thereby allowing for possible lag effects. In each case however, there were again no significant 
correlations. Overall, the results could therefore be taken to suggest that neither the efficiency nor the 
compensation hypothesis was significant over this period; trends in government spending were instead 
driven by other factors. However, these results must be treated with caution, since they fail to control 
for other possible influences on spending. In the next section therefore, we extend the analysis to more 
powerful multivariate analysis.
6 |  MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we look at the effect of globalisation on government consumption spending, using the 
PWT data set (version 9.0). Table 2 shows the results for 1992–2014, while Table 3 shows the results 
for 1972–2014; in each case, columns (1)–(3) show the IV results, while columns (4)–(6) show the 
DK-FE results. For the IV regressions, our instruments pass the tests for under-identification and 
weak identification in all cases, but there is clear evidence of endogeneity only for the KOF indices 
 21Note that we were unable to produce a similar graph using the IMF spending data, since these data are more patchy: there 
are relatively few countries, which provide a complete set of observations over the whole period.
 22Garett (1998:18) makes a similar point, comparing trends in international trade, capital mobility and government spending 
in the decade before and after 1985: 'spending growth slowed down at precisely the point when market integration took off'.
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(see Appendix Table A4). This means that the IV results in columns (1) and (2) are preferable for the 
KOF indices, but the DK-FE results in column (6) are preferable for the trade–GDP ratio.
The results in Table 2 show mixed evidence regarding the effects of trade and financial globalisa-
tion on government spending during the 1990s and 2000s. On the one hand, we find that de jure trade 
globalisation had a positive effect, while de jure financial globalisation index had a negative impact. 
Both of these effects are statistically significant at the 1% level under our preferred approach (IV in 
this case), and quite large in size: the coefficients in column (2) suggest that a 10-point increase in the 
de jure trade globalisation index—which corresponds to the median change over the period among 
our sample of countries—would increase spending by around 17%, while a similar rise in the de jure 
financial globalisation index would reduce spending by around 8%. These amounts are clearly not 
trivial, although they might still be swamped by other influences on spending, especially in non-
OECD countries where the median absolute deviation in government consumption spending is just 
under 6% per year. However, we find no evidence that de facto trade or financial globalisation affected 
government spending, nor the trade–GDP ratio. For the Chinn–Ito index, we do find some evidence of 
a negative relationship, consistent with the results for the de jure financial globalisation index, but the 
results are not statistically significant under our preferred approach (DK-FE in this case).
The results for the control variables in Table 2 are somewhat mixed, depending on the estimation 
method. For the DK-FE results, we observe negative and statistically significant relationships between 
F I G U R E  1  Trends in economic globalisation, 1970–2016. Source: PWT, KOF, WDI. The sample of countries 
in each graph is constant over time: 24 OECD and 127 non-OECD countries for the PWT, 24 OECD countries and 97 
non-OECD countries for the KOF indices, 21 OECD countries and 71 non-OECD countries for the Chinn–Ito index, 
and 24 OECD and 93 non-OECD countries for the WDI data. Each included country has a full set of observations 
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spending and GDP per capita (thus refuting Wagner's Law), population (supporting the results of 
Alesina & Wacziarg, 1998), the price ratio of government consumption to household consumption 
(consistent with Gemmell et al., 2008) and the KOF index of political globalisation. We also find 
positive and statistically significant relationships for the dependency ratio, urbanisation and the KOF 
index of social globalisation (consistent with Meinhard & Potrafke, 2012). For the IV results however, 
the results are statistically significant in much fewer cases, namely the consumption price ratio, the 
dependency ratio, population and the index of social globalisation, although in only one case do we 
see a result that is both statistically significant and of the opposite sign across methods (the KOF index 
of political globalisation).
Turning now to the results for the whole period in Table 3, we find that de facto trade globalisation 
did have a positive effect on government spending during the 1970s and 1980s, but the effect weak-
ened significantly during the 1990s and 2000s. The coefficients in column (1) imply that a 10-point 
increase in the de facto trade globalisation index in the 1970s and 1980s would increase spending by 
17% (statistically significant at the 1% level), but only by 3% in the 1990s and 2000s; the difference 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. By contrast, de jure trade globalisation had a slightly larger 
positive impact on spending in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1970s and 1980s, with a 10-point 
increase in the index raising spending by around 12% compared to 8% (column (2)); the difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. We also find that the negative effect of de jure financial glo-
balisation was larger in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1970s and 1980s, with a 10-point increase in 
the index reducing spending by 7% compared to 3%; the difference is again statistically significant at 
the 5% level.
Table 4 shows the results of our tests for possible differences in the relationship between trade 
openness and government spending across countries. Columns (1)–(3) re-estimate the regressions in 
Table 2 including interaction terms between each measure of trade globalisation and the export con-
centration index; columns (4)–(6) then repeat the regressions in Table 3 including interaction terms 
with a dummy for OECD countries. In each case, we show the results for our preferred estimation 
F I G U R E  2  Trends in government consumption spending, 1970–2016. Source: PWT, WDI. The sample of 
countries in each case is constant over time: 24 OECD and 127 non-OECD countries for the PWT, and 24 OECD 
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method only, which remains IV for the KOF indices and DK-FE for the trade–GDP ratio; to econo-
mise on space, we also show the results for the variables of interest only. For the KOF indices, there 
is no evidence of any differences in the relationship between trade openness and spending across 
countries: none of the interaction terms are statistically significant, although we do still see a positive 
and statistically significant ‘level’ effect for the de jure trade index in column (2), and a statistically 
significant positive but weakening effect for the de facto index in column (4). For the trade–GDP 
ratio, the interaction with export concentration is again not statistically significant, but we do see sig-
nificant differences between OECD and non-OECD countries. In particular, the results in column (6) 
suggest that a 50% increase in the trade–GDP ratio in the 1970s and 1980s would increase spending 
among OECD countries by 8.5% (statistically significant at the 1% level), compared to 1.1% among 
non-OECD countries (not statistically significant). The results also suggest that the effect in OECD 
countries weakened in the 1990s and 2000s, with a similar increase in the trade–GDP ratio raising 
spending by 6.5% in this period.
In summary therefore, the results in this section suggest that the ‘hyper-globalisation’ of the 1990s 
and 2000s had divergent and conflicting effects on government spending. While there is evidence that 
trade globalisation raised spending, consistent with the compensation hypothesis, financial globali-
sation appears to have reduced it, consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. However, the results also 
show that the size and statistical significance of these effects varies across countries and over time, and 
F I G U R E  3  Simple correlations between changes in globalisation and changes in government consumption 
spending, 1990–2008. Source: PWT, KOF, Chinn–Ito. The vertical axis in each plot shows the change in government 
consumption spending as a share of GDP, taken from the PWT database. The number of countries included in each 
plot varies from 134 to 158. None of the correlations are statistically significant at conventional levels
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also depends on the way in which globalisation is defined and measured. The evidence for the 1990s 
and 2000s applies to the ‘policy-based’ KOF indices of de jure trade and financial globalisation, and 
in these cases, the effects on spending appear to be slightly larger during the 1990s and 2000s—more 
positive and more negative, respectively—than in earlier decades. By contrast, while we do find a 
positive effect of the ‘outcome-based’ KOF index of de facto trade globalisation during the 1970s and 
1980s, this effect weakened significantly during the 1990s and 2000s. A similar pattern holds when 
using the trade–GDP ratio, although in the case only among OECD countries. These differences in 
results between policy-based and outcome-based measures of trade and financial globalisation are not 
surprising, since the correlation between them is not high (see Section 4.2 above). More surprising, 
however, is the stronger evidence of a positive relationship between trade openness and government 
spending among OECD than non-OECD countries. This is in fact the opposite of what we would ex-
pect according to the compensation hypothesis, as OECD countries typically have much lower levels 
of exposure to external risk; the average export concentration index among OECD countries is, e.g., 
less than half of the average among non-OECD countries.
Two final points regarding our main results are worth mentioning. First, although we find evidence 
of a negative relationship between the KOF de jure financial globalisation index and government 
spending, conclusions around causality are more uncertain in this case, due to a lack of adequate in-
struments for these measures. For trade globalisation however, our results confirm the importance of 
controlling for endogeneity in this context. As noted above, our results provide significant evidence 
T A B L E  4  Additional results: trade globalisation interactions with export concentration and OECD dummy
Period 1992–2014 1972–2014
Estimation method IV IV DK-FE IV IV DK-FE













1 2 3 4 5 6
‘Level’ effect 0.003 0.014** 0.047 0.014*** 0.006 0.028
(0.009) (0.007) (0.033) (0.005) (0.007) (0.023)
Interaction terms:
Export concentration 0.008 0.004 −0.074 – – –
(0.011) (0.007) (0.048)
OECD countries – – – 0.003 −0.001 0.177***
– – – (0.005) (0.003) (0.028)
1990s and 2000s – – – −0.009* 0.006 0.017
– – – (0.005) (0.006) (0.020)
OECD countries & 1990s and 
2000s
– – – −0.0004 −0.001 −0.065***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.021)
No. of observations 2,445 2,445 2,549 4,988 4,988 4,693
No. of countries 137 137 135 116 116 115
Note: The dependent variable in each case is the log of government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP; each regression 
includes all the control variables shown in Tables 2, 3 plus a measure of financial globalisation (KOF de facto, KOF de jure or 
Chinn–Ito index in columns (1)–(3) and (4)–(6), respectively), a full set of year dummies and a constant term. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses; ***(**)(*) represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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of endogeneity for the KOF indices of trade globalisation (both de facto and de jure) and show that 
controlling for endogeneity using IV estimation makes a large difference to the results for these mea-
sures. To give one example, while the DK-FE results in Table 2 suggest that de jure trade globalisation 
increased spending, the evidence is weaker than for the IV results, and the size of the effect is con-
siderably smaller. To give another, the DK-FE results in Table 3 show no evidence of a relationship 
between the de facto KOF trade globalisation index and spending, in marked contrast to the IV results.
7 |  ADDITIONAL RESULTS
This section contains the results for our robustness tests (Section 7.1) and the other expenditure meas-
ures (Section 7.2).
7.1 | Robustness tests
Table 5 summarises the results of our robustness tests. Columns (1)–(2) test for the possible effects 
of outliers: we first omit very small countries in the sample, defined as those with populations of less 
than a million (column (1)); we then omit countries with very large changes in either globalisation 
or government spending during the 1990s and 2000s, defined as changes that lie more than 1.5 inter-
quartile ranges above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile (column (2)). Columns (3)–(5) 
add other potential explanatory variables: institutional quality (column (3)), combined with income 
inequality (column (4)), and external debt and foreign aid (column (5)). Column (6) adds a quadratic 
term for each globalisation measure, to allow for a possible non-linear relationship between globali-
sation and spending; column (7) repeats each regression using data converted into 5-year averages, 
while columns (8) and (9) repeat the estimates for subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries. 
Finally, column (10) shows the results using GMM. For each robustness test, we show the sign and 
significance of the coefficients found to be statistically significant in Tables 2–4, namely those for the 
de jure trade globalisation index (from Table 2), the de facto trade globalisation index and its interac-
tion with the dummy for the 1990s and 2000s (from Table 3), and the trade-GDP ratio and its interac-
tions with the dummies for OECD countries and the 1990s and 2000s (from Table 4).
Table 5 suggests that the findings from Section 6 are fairly robust to the exclusion of potential 
outliers and the inclusion of additional control variables (columns (1)–(6)); the only main exception 
in this case is the negative coefficient on the interaction between de facto trade globalisation and the 
dummy for the 1990s and 2000s, which is no longer significant in columns three out of five cases, 
and the positive coefficient on the de jure trade globalisation index, which is no longer significant in 
two. The results are also robust to the use of five-year averages rather than annual data. However, the 
results for the KOF indices of trade globalisation (both de facto and de jure) are no longer significant 
when adding squared terms for these indices—although in these cases, the squared terms are also not 
statistically significant, so there is no evidence of non-linearity. The results for the KOF indices are 
also no longer significant if we estimate separate regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries, ex-
cept the de jure trade globalisation index, which remains positive for the non-OECD country sample; 
for the trade–GDP ratio, we still find a positive relationship among the OECD country sample, con-
sistent with our main results, but no evidence of a weakening in the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, when 
using GMM we still see statistically significant effects of de jure trade and financial globalisation in 
the 1990s and 2000s (positive and negative, respectively), and a statistically significant weakening 
of the relationship between trade openness and government spending among OECD countries in the 
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1990s and 2000s, but the other effects are no longer statistically significant. Overall therefore, the 
main findings from Section 6 are reasonably robust to a range of different samples and specifications, 
although not entirely so.
7.2 | Other expenditure measures
We show the summary of results for other expenditure measures in Table 6. As noted earlier, in ad-
dition to our social welfare measures (i.e., IMF COFOG social protection and IMF ECOG social 
benefits spending measures, SW COFOG and SW ECOG, respectively), we follow Oxley and Martin 
(1991) and Saunders (1993) to categorise IMF functional classification of spending into pure public 
goods, merit goods and economic services. We estimate the results using fixed effects with DK-SEs 
T A B L E  5  Summary of results for robustness tests
Robustness test
1 2 3 4 5
No small 
countries No large changes Controls 1 Controls 2 Controls 3
Trade glob. (de facto) + + + + +
Trade glob. (de facto) * 
1990s and 2000s
− no − no no
Trade-GDP ratio * 
OECD countries
+ + + + .
Trade-GDP * OECD * 
1990s and 2000s
− − − − .
Trade glob. (de jure) + + + no no
Financial glob. (de jure) − − − − −









Trade glob. (de facto) + no no no no
Trade glob. (de facto) * 
1990s and 2000s
− no no no no
Trade-GDP ratio * 
OECD countries
+ + + . no
Trade-GDP * OECD * 
1990s and 2000s
− − no . −
Trade glob. (de jure) + no no + +
Financial glob. (de jure) − − − − −
Note: Here, + (−) (no) refer to positive and statistically significant effect, negative and statistically significant effect and no 
statistically significant effect, respectively (significance at the 10% level or below in each case); (.) indicates not applicable. Column 
(3) refers to estimations with institutional quality as the additional control, column (4) refers to estimations with institutional quality 
and market income inequality, while column (5) refers to estimations with institutional quality, foreign aid and external debt stock as 
additional controls. Note that column (5) includes data for non-OECD countries only (OECD countries do not have observations for 
external debt and foreign aid). The results for de facto trade globalisation and the trade–GDP ratio are based on estimations covering 
period 1972–2014 (cf. Table 3), while those for de jure trade and final globalisation cover the period 1992–2014 (cf. Table 2).
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and the IV approach. Interestingly, in the IV estimations, none of the globalisation measures is statisti-
cally significant.
We begin with the results for pure public goods. From the fixed-effects estimations, we find that 
the de facto financial globalisation index and the de jure trade globalisation index are positively and 
significantly associated with government spending on pure public goods. There is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the de jure financial globalisation index and government 
spending on pure public goods. Turning to economic services, there is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the de facto and the de jure financial globalisation indices, and the 
Chinn–Ito index and government spending on economic services. All other globalisation variables 
show no statistically significant effect in the fixed-effects estimation.
Turning to merit goods, the fixed-effects estimation results show the de facto and the de jure 
trade globalisation indices have a negative and statistically significant link with government spending 
on merit goods. There is no statistically significant relationship between all other measures of glo-
balisation and government spending on merit goods. From column (5) of Table 6, the fixed-effects 
estimation results show a negative effect of the de facto trade globalisation index, the de jure trade 
globalisation index and trade openness on social welfare spending. There is a positive relationship be-
tween the de facto financial globalisation index and COFOG social welfare spending. Finally, we turn 
to ECOG social welfare spending. The fixed-effects estimation results show negative effects of the de 
facto trade globalisation index and the trade openness variable on the ECOG social welfare spending. 
There is a positive effect of de facto financial globalisation index on ECOG social welfare spending.
In sum, the effects of the globalisation variables here largely depend on the type of government 
spending under consideration. What is obvious is that there is more evidence for compensation for 
pure public goods, while evidence of efficiency occurs more for economic services and spending on 
merit goods. For government spending on social welfare spending, governments may either opt to 
compensate for increases in outcomes of actual financial flows or reduce spending on social welfare 
with increases in actual trade flows or changes in policies that affect actual trade flows.
8 |  CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide an up-to-date empirical assessment of the relationship between economic 
globalisation and government spending for the hyper-globalisation period of the 1990s and 2000s. 
We use the most recent available data on government consumption spending from the Penn World 
Tables, and more disaggregated spending measures from the IMF Government Financial Statistics. 
We also use the most recent version of the KOF globalisation index (Gygli et al., 2018), alongside a 
range of more commonly used globalisation measures. Our study is to our knowledge the first to focus 
specifically on the hyper-globalisation period, and to compare the evidence for this period with the 
1970s and 1980s, while at the same time distinguishing between the trade and financial components 
of economic globalisation, and between de jure (policy-based) and de facto (outcome-based) globali-
sation. We also control more effectively for the potential endogeneity of measured globalisation than 
has been possible in previous research, through the use of IV estimation.
We have two main findings. First, we find that the hyper-globalisation of the 1990s and 2000s had 
divergent and conflicting effects on government spending. While de jure trade globalisation tended 
to raise consumption spending, de jure financial globalisation tended to reduce it. Second, we find 
evidence of a positive effect of de facto trade globalisation on spending, but the size of the effect 
weakened significantly during the 1990s and 2000s compared to the 1970s and 1980s. The positive 
effect of trade globalisation is consistent with the ‘compensation hypothesis’, according to which 
   | 25ANDERSON AND OBENG
governments respond to globalisation by increasing spending, as a means of offsetting the volatility 
and insecurity resulting from greater exposure to global markets. The negative effect of financial 
globalisation, by contrast, is consistent with the ‘efficiency hypothesis’, whereby globalisation puts 
pressure on governments to reduce spending, due, e.g., to pressures on tax revenues resulting from 
the increasing mobility of capital. Thus, rather than choosing between these two hypotheses, our re-
sults provide support for both—once we disaggregate between the trade and financial dimensions of 
economic globalisation, and between de jure and de facto globalisation—although the strength of the 
compensation effect appears to have weakened in the 1990s and 2000s.
A number of caveats and qualifications must be noted. First, although we find evidence of a nega-
tive relationship between de jure financial globalisation and government spending, conclusions around 
causality are more difficult in this case, due to a lack of adequate instruments for these measures. This 
remains one of the limitations of our approach. Second, while our main results are reasonably robust to 
a range of different samples, specifications and estimation methods, there are some exceptions. Third, 
while the size of the effects of globalisation on government spending is clearly not trivial, they are 
not that large given the large variation in levels of spending over time. This suggests the extent of any 
‘compensation’ provided by increased government consumption spending in response to trade global-
isation in the 1990s and 2000s has been limited in size, particularly in non-OECD countries where 
variation in levels of spending over time is greater. In addition, there is no evidence that consumption 
spending has risen by more in countries, which are particularly prone to external trade risk and which 
for that reason need compensation most. This suggests that the positive relationship between trade 
globalisation and consumption spending may be driven by forces other than compensation (see, e.g., 
Jetter & Parmeter, 2015). Finally, it is interesting to note that the KOF index of social globalisation 
T A B L E  6  Summary of results for other expenditure measure fixed effects with DK-SEs and IV, 1990–2016




KOFTrdf No No − − −
KOFFidf + − No + +
KOFTrdj + No − − No
KOFFidj − − No No No
TO No No No − −
Chinn–Ito No − No No No
IV
KOFTrdf No No No No No
KOFFidf No No No No No
KOFTrdj No No No No No
KOFFidj No No No No No
TO No No No No No
Chinn–Ito No No No No No
Note: Summary of results for the globalisation variables using fixed effects with DK-FE SE and IV. Here, + (−) (No) refer to positive 
effect, negative effect and no effect, respectively. In the SW COFOG estimation, the functional form used (which gives the best 
results) has the dependent variable measured as share of GDP, dependency ratio as share of total population, urbanisation as share of 
total population, trade openness as share of GDP, while all other variables are in natural logarithm form except the indices. We use 
***(**)(*) representing statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels of significance as the significance criterion.
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in fact has a larger effect on consumption spending than either trade or financial globalisation, across 
almost all of our estimations. This result is unexpected and merits further investigation in future work 
(for similar findings on the effect of social globalisation, see Meinhard & Potrafke, 2012).
Notwithstanding these qualifications, our results provide some implications for policy. Our paper 
was motivated by the evidence of a growing political ‘backlash’ against globalisation since the early 
2000s, which has threatened to undermine the benefits of globalisation, through a return to trade 
protectionism and economic nationalism. Our results suggest that the combination of rapid trade and 
financial globalisation, which characterised the hyper-globalisation of the 1990s and 2000s, may have 
been at least partly to blame. While financial globalisation is unlikely to have been the main driving 
force behind the declining levels of government spending as a share of GDP shown in Section 5, 
higher levels of international capital mobility do appear to have offset the ability of governments to 
provide the compensation required to make the globalisation of trade politically sustainable. To avoid 
this outcome in future, governments should either proceed more cautiously with financial globalisa-
tion, or instead seek to manage the damaging effects of capital mobility through greater steps towards 
international tax cooperation and coordination.
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APPENDIX 
T A B L E  A 1  Variables and definitions
Variable Definition Data source
Consumption 
spending
Government final consumption expenditure as a share of 
GDP
Penn World Table version 
9.0
Social benefits IMF ECOG social benefits. Includes government spending 
on social security benefits, social assistance benefits, as 
well as employment-related social benefits, all in cash 
and in kind
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Social protection (SW 
COFOG)
IMF COFOG social protection. This refers to government 
spending on sicknesses and disability, old age, survivors, 
family and children, unemployment, housing, other 
social exclusion, R&D social protection, and other forms 
of social protection.
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Social benefits (SW 
ECOG)
IMF ECOG social benefits. This refers to government 
spending on social security benefits (in case and in 
kind), social assistance benefits (in cash and in kind) and 
employment-related social benefits (in cash and in kind)
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Pure public goods General public services plus defence plus public order and 
safety spending from IMF COFOG spending
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Merit goods Housing and community amenities plus health plus 
education spending from IMF COFOG spending
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Economic services Economic affairs plus environment protection plus 
recreation spending from IMF COFOG spending
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS, 2018)
Real GDP per capita Expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs divided by 
total population.
Penn World Tables 
version 9.0
Dependency Sum of the proportion of the population in the ages 
0–14 years and the proportion of the population in the 
ages 65+ as percentage of total population
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2018)
Urbanisation Urban population as a percentage of total population. World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2018).
Total population Total population Penn World Tables 
version 9.0
Price ratio Ratio of price level of government consumption to the 
price level of household consumption
Penn World Tables 
version 9.0
KOFTrGIdf KOF trade globalisation index, de facto Gygli et al. (2018)
KOFFiGIdf KOF financial globalisation index, de facto Gygli et al. (2018)
KOFSoGI KOF social globalisation index Gygli et al. (2018)
KOFPoGI KOF political globalisation index Gygli et al. (2018)
KOFTrGIdj KOF trade globalisation index, de jure Gygli et al. (2018)
KOFFiGIdj KOF financial globalisation index, de jure Gygli et al. (2018)
Trade openness Sum of imports and exports as percentage of GDP Penn World Tables 
version 9.0
(Continues)
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Variable Definition Data source
Chinn–Ito index Chinn–Ito index of capital account liberalisation Chinn and Ito (2006)
Debt stock External debt stock as a percentage of gross national 
income (GNI)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2018)
Foreign aid Net official development assistance (ODA) receipts as a 
percentage of gross national income (GNI)
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI, 2018)
Polity2 Polity2 index Polity4 project, Marshall 
et al. (2014)




Measure of the extent to which a country's exports 
are concentrated (based on a single or few goods) or 
diversified (based on a lot more goods)
WITS Trade Data and 
UNCTAD Trade 
Statistics
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
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T A B L E  A 2  Descriptive statistics (1992–2014 sample)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Spending variables
Consumption spending 3,151 0.177 0.086 0.017 0.954
Baseline controls
Real GDP per capita 3,151 14,450 17,515 142 159,826
Dependency 3,151 38.8 7.2 14.1 54.1
Urbanisation 3,151 56.2 23.4 6.3 100.0
Total Population 3,151 43.9 148.0 0.1 1,369.4
Price ratio 3,151 0.985 0.799 0.011 27.346
Globalisation variables
KOFTrGIdf 3,151 52.7 19.9 3.6 98.6
KOFFiGIdf 3,151 58.5 20.3 10.3 100.0
KOFTrGIdj 3,151 55.0 23.3 7.8 98.9
KOFFiGIdj 3,151 49.3 25.5 1.0 96.1
KOFSoGI 3,151 52.8 20.9 8.9 90.7
KOFPoGI 3,151 65.5 20.2 11.0 99.5
Trade openness 3,151 0.569 0.531 0.013 6.091
Chinn–Ito index 3,061 0.333 1.595 −1.910 2.360
Additional controls
Debt stock 1,973 68.8 90.1 0.9 1,380.8
Foreign aid 2,228 6.5 10.7 −0.7 192.0
Polity2 2,985 3.8 6.4 −10.0 10.0
Export concentration 2,719 0.323 0.210 0.052 0.961
Instrumental variables
Ω 2,143 0.661 0.372 0.143 3.402
KOFTrGIdf 3,151 54.2 5.2 39.4 67.9
KOFFiGIdf 3,151 59.3 6.1 43.7 79.4
KOFTrGIdj 3,151 55.3 8.5 35.9 76.5
KOFFiGIdj 3,151 49.8 5.9 37.4 67.6
Other expenditure measures
Pure public goods 1,296 12.124 27.213 1.923 524.783
Merit goods 1,033 5.586 2.645 0.436 27.111
Economic services 1,296 8.807 3.989 0.352 18.722
Social benefits 1,296 8.554 7.305 0 25.580
Social protection 1,451 8.363 7.498 0 26.013
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T A B L E  A 3  Correlation matrix of some variables
Variable KOFTrGf KOFFiGf KOFTrGj KOFFiGj KOFSoGI KOFPoGI
KOFTrGIdf 1.0000
KOFFiGIdf 0.6004 1.0000
KOFTrGIdj 0.2651 0.5771 1.0000
KOFFiGIdj 0.1613 0.4988 0.6243 1.0000
KOFSoGI 0.3423 0.6417 0.8313 0.6569 1.0000
KOFPoGI −0.0853 0.2268 0.4474 0.3427 0.5569 1.0000







Variable Social benefits Social protection Consumption
Social benefits 1
Social protection 0.9515 1
Consumption 0.5098 0.4795 1
T A B L E  A 4  Test statistics for IV estimations: Main results
1992–2014 (Table 2)
1 2 3
K-P(under) 12.8 (0.00) 19.7 (0.00) 10.0 (0.00)
C-D(weak) 62.9 295.2 888.8
Endog. test 16.97 (0.00) 4.4 (0.04) 1.7 (0.19)
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 20.7 (0.00) 10.5 (0.00) 24.7 (0.00) - 65.5 (0.00) -
S-W F test 18.7 (0.00) 13.3 (0.00) 24.7 (0.00) - 65.5 (0.00) -
1972–2014 (Table 3)
1 2 3
K-P(under) 3.0 (0.08) 15.1 (0.00) 9.9 (0.00)
C-D(weak) 16.0 243.2 669.3
Endog. test 11.6 (0.02) 1.1 (0.57) 1.9 (0.38)
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 12.5 (0.00) 6.6 (0.00) 11.5 (0.00) 72.4 (0.00) 43.5 (0.00) 25.3 (0.00)
S-W F test 28.3 (0.00) 4.2 (0.04) 22.5 (0.00) 141.1 (0.00) 93.4 (0.00) 60.2 (0.00)
(c) (d)
F-stat excl 9.3 (0.00) 23.3 (0.00)
S-W F test 20.3 (0.00) 7.4 (0.01)
Note: Each set of three columns represents estimations with the de facto globalisation measures, the de jure globalisation measures 
and the two individual measures of globalisation (i.e., trade–GDP ratio and the Chinn–Ito index), respectively. The columns 
marked (a), (b), etc show the results of excluded instruments from the first-stage regressions; note that the de jure index of financial 
globalisation and the Chinn–Ito index are assumed exogenous.
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T A B L E  A 5  Test statistics for IV estimations: Other expenditures
Pure goods
1 2 3
K-P(under) 1.895 (0.169) 0.124 (0.725) 1.194 (0.2744)
C-D(weak) 7.265 0.696 4.008
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 16.04 (0.000) 5.44 (0.006) 1.00 (0.371) 2.10 (0.128) 7,366 (0.000) 8.13 (0.001)
S-W F test 1.80 (0.183) 1.90 (0.171) 0.12 (0.729) 0.13 (0.715) 1.20 (0.276) 1.28 (0.262)
Economic services
1 2 3
K-P(under) 3.244 (0.007) 0.589 (0.443) 0.026 (0.872)
C-D(weak) 11.868 2.04 0.08
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 13.18 (0.000) 2.83 (0.065) 0.41 (0.666) 0.98 (0.382) 88.39 (0.000) 5.07 (0.009)
S-W F test 8.73 (0.004) 3.58 (0.062) 0.74 (0.392) 1.80 (0.184) 0.02 (0.876) 0.02 (0.876)
Merit goods
1 2 3
K-P(under) 1.895 (0.169) 0.124 (0.725) 1.194 (0.274)
C-D(weak) 7.265 0.696 4.008
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 16.04 (0.000) 5.44 (0.006) 1.00 (0.371) 2.10 (0.128) 73.66 (0.000) 8.13 (0.001)
S-W F test 1.80 (0.183) 1.90 (0.171) 0.12 (0.729) 0.13 (0.715) 1.20 (0.276) 1.28 (0.262)
SW COFOG
1 2 3
K-P(under) 3.878 (0.049) 1.044 (0.307) 0.749 (0.387)
C-D(weak) 12.935 5.803 4.15
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 17.13 (0.000) 9.18 (0.000) 2.93 (0.058) 1.83 (0.165) 95.08 (0.000) 1.04 (0.359)
S-W F test 3.91 (0.051) 4.44 (0.038) 1.75 (0.189) 1.17 (0.282) 1.74 (0.190) 0.76 (0.385)
SW ECOG
1 2 3
K-P(under) 1.895 (0.169) 0.124 (0.725) 1.194 (0.274)
C-D(weak) 7.265 0.696 4.008
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
F-stat excl 16.04 (0.000) 5.44 (0.006) 1.00 (0.371 ) 2.10 (0.128) 73.66 (0.000) 8.13 (0.001)
S-W F test 1.88 (0.183) 1.90 (0.171) 0.12 (0.729) 0.13 (0.715) 1.20 (0.276) 1.28(0.262)
Note: Each set of three columns represents estimations with the de facto globalisation measures, the de jure globalisation measures 
and the two individual measures of globalisation (i.e., trade–GDP ratio and the Chinn–Ito index), respectively.
